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Summary 
The di.s...olurion of tht' former Yugoslav fe4:rarion was to a ~muller extent 
hrou!!lll about bv the nanon.•l mnvem~n''· md by u larger by the hrcak d~11 
ut the old polit(cal ordu. 111~ Cvmmun~t Party "as the only oobc:.i\lt~ force o t 
Yuqo<>Ja~· and :all other a•mmuni:.t fedcrntion' Tbt:ndurc, the coli3JlSC of Mm-
munC.m prm-okcd the bt"e;jl.:-up cof ft'dcrral mulricthnic W tes in F~~IC'f 11 EurU{>C. 
O.:mOCTaC\ . roliti.~l plunli-.uo market reform.'\ and ~-.:ntr:alWIUun tcndcnaes 
\\cr~ tht: ~ncx of tbc JCI' '-1991 rl'\olutiun. Market reforms were the moM 
JXIWCrllll force uf di~inregt:'llllllt m former communist <.ciCietie& Di\'t'rgo::nt differ-
ent inu~re~•~ o( dl.'' duped Hod uoderdevelnrect f«let a.l ro::JlUblics produced politi-
atl l'Vnfrumauon, and s rimuli'l tMl nationuli~t movements. 
The new nation >tatt:s .:merged as a continuMiotJ u( the process of nation-
huildin~ which wns interrupted hy eilho.:r multicthnic empires ns rotUilluuist 
tcdcranons. 
Setllia "a:. an undcrdcvelo~~ repuhtic uf former Yugoslavia. which de 
pendcd very much on fedc;ral r-.-wun:t'S.. !:>crhian leade~h•p opposed to both the 
political and masket rdonm. and dcccotralirntion to:udciiCle& That policy p~ 
mkt'd a m~t\C natiooaliM r~poASt' in S<rh•a and propelled Serbia into \\'liT 
!12lllDSt all other republics 111d .,...>pies ot rormcr Yui!OSI:wia. 
Schohtr;, as well as politician:., lend to see the bjg J9R9 change in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union o nly as a victory of democracy anJ 
the market t:conomy. They fail to recognize that rhe whole map of the 
workl, and Eastern buropc: especially, has been changed. The old security 
mechantsms have dll;appcarecl, and new states have e me rged. Man) of 
them couldn't understand that all four clements (democracy, the market 
economy, security nnd the mllion-stmes) were in!.cparahlt: pans of the 
same process. The cnmmon denominator of the whole process was Lln: 
1989 revolution. 
The Jack of secutity structures in the post-Communi~t world opened 
the door fo r the regionu I military conflicLo; and protracted bloody wars. 
But the main question was: why did ;Ill that happen'! The essence of the 
problem was, firstly, the di-.integration of the former Communist federa-
uons with the cmt:rgence of the new nation-states. and, secondly. the par-
ticular <.<tu<res of the blood) break-up of former Yugoslavia. 
Superficial analysts are able to l-tcc only apocalyptic nationalist strives 
11nd the centuries old ethnic hatreds that propel clhnic groups in Eastern 
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Europe into conflicts and violence. Western statesmen have not demon-
strated any clear uoderstau<.ling of the inevitability of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia or of the causes of the ensuing war. rhe claim that the driv-
in!t forces of history in Yugosla\ ia were .. ancient ethnic h~tlrcds'' implic 
that ~:vcrynne wa\ equally rc..,pon ihle for the war and that nobody wa.s 
'-pecific.11ty guihy.~ [t means that the anacker and the victims of aggres-
SIOn are reduced to the sam~:: status.: ht fact. it i .. im[Xl'sihle to fmd re-
c.:or<.ll> of any 'erinus Croatit~n-Serbian confiicts or wars, before the twenti-
eth century. 
The recent public opi11ion \Urvcy un ethnic issues in Croatia and sev-
eral other countries in Eastern Europe and three western states (Britain, 
Uermany, France - the control group) cmt<.luctctl by the Office of Re-
search and Media Rcactiun uf the United States Information Agency in 
1993 and 1994 demonsmlted that Croats endorse a multietJmic sncietv. 
Croatian attitudes toward urban Serbs arc quilc similflr to those expressed 
by 1 he ol h~,;r east Europeans toward minorities or west Europeans toward 
the immigrants in their countries (Tab. 1).3 Research has shown that the 
majority of Croats believt:: thaL a multiethnic Croatia is possible. Despite 
their dislike of Krajina Serbs, and the ongoing war, two-thirds of CroaLo., 
accept the idea of their homeland as a muiLiclhnic cuuntry. A comparison 
of Croats with other cast Hnd we~t Europeans displays that ethnic Croats 
.. arc among the least likely tO express majority exclusive s~::ntimenLs" (Tah. 
2).4 The conclusion is simple. CroaLo., arc ~•mong the mo t tolerant of 
ethnic brruup" and they are the most likely to endorse the idea of multi-
ethnic soctety. 
1 Malcolm :-.:oeJ recorded a typical example - the tatement of former British 
t-orc1gn See:ret:~ry Douglas Hurd· ~Yugoslavia was invented in 1919 to solve a 
p•oblem of dilJen:nl people:. hving in the c;ame part of the Balkans with a long 
htstory of peoples figbling each other... Lotd Carrin~ton, the EC negotiator. had 
lhe snm~: stam.lpoinl: 'C\'crybody IS to hlame in Bosnia and Hercegovina... :-.:oet 
addecf that American politicians we1e not immune to the tcmpuuions of such 
''lhcodcl>". (Malcolm, Noel, "Ho~nia a ncl Lbe West: 1\ Study in Failure", The: 
Nntionrl! /merest. Spring 1995. p. 5.) 
2 ~ot to mention Lha1 rhe thesis "everyone is 1~pousiblc'' is un essentially 
racist inte1 P• etatiou n;fcrriug to lhc East b.umpean peoples as tribes genetically 
programmed for violence and thus equally to blam~: for Ute war . 
.3 l11e t:lhnit: Croats strongly dislike " Krt~jina" Serbs, but they have a more 
favourable opinion of urban Serbs living in Croulia. The Krujina Serh~ started the 
war against C. oatia anc.l with the open support of Sc1 bi::~ p1 oclaimed the 
~eparntist Kepublic of Serbian Krnjim1 0 11 the Croatian territory. 
J Sour,c: Public Opinion in Croatia: A Special Rcp<JrL. A Special Report 
Issued hy lhe Office of Kesearch and Media Reaction, U.S. lofounation Agem:y, 
Wa:.hinglon, DC, 199-t pp. 3-5. 
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Table 1: Opinion of minority Group by majority group aero s Europe 
(in percent) 
·7':' .. 0 :- r:o,7 -:-;:- · EayourabJe .:i'UnfavourabJe ' : -;-~ . ·~ = 
Croatia Krajinu Serbs 6 94 Urhan Serbs 48 52 
Serbia Albanians 1l 83 
Macedonia AJbanians 2R 65 
AJbania Greeks 47 49 
Bull!3ria Turks 52 39 
Romania Ilun.1radans 50 40 
Slovakia Hum~ariaos 43 53 
Lttvia Russians 46 43 
France fmmigraots 47 46 
Britain Immigrants 40 41 
<Jermanv Immil.rrants 47 52 




d~:· · Ganno~ fjv,e .ili:i:,:batrr.r(jnv' ·i·Go~rit~.:· utlN:i:(0{:!:niit;i~na l:l~tv.. 
Croat in 23 22 
Macedonia 34 59 
Nbania 60 80 
Bull!aria 27 51 
Romania 11 14 
Slovaki<t 20 22 
Poland 5~ 40 
!·ranee 35 38 
Gennanv 38 35 
Britain 35 35 
Therefore, it is clear that "ethnic hatreds" cannot be the cause of the 
wur in rurmer Yugoslavia. Such an explanation demonstrate the superficial-
ity of approach and ignorance. lntcUectual lazine. s makes it difficult to 
why aU po..t-Communist ft!dcrations couldn't survive the break down of 
communism or why former Yugoslavia was plungeu into war, while 
Czechoslovakia m;maged to ach ic:ve <1 velvet divorce. 
In the discourses dt!aling with nationalism in Eastern Europe the 
reader can find renewed distinction hetween historic and non-historic na-
tions. This difre renriatioo separates 1be nations who were rna ters of their 
history from those who played no role in history because they didn' t have 
an independent state. lt i.~ easy to c.onclude that peoples of Lite easte rn 
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part of Europe are those whcl represent non-historic nations.5 It simply 
means that the process of nation-building in Eastern Europt.: has not been 
compJe tcLI. 
Sugar tries to support this thesis hy referring to Oscar J. Janowsky, 
who points out that •· ... unlike western .Europe, where relative national ho-
mogeneity was adti.eved before the nineteenth centu ry ... eastern and east-
central Europe has nurtured differences to the present day.''li That is the 
essence of the issue of the po't-Communist nationali,m. Therefore, liberty 
for the old nationl-, tbe French and the British, means democracy, and in 
81\tL"TD Europe liberty represents the absence of foreign rule and the es-
tablishment of nation-state. The lack of normal acccplance of a national 
interes t in Communist countries was a form of deprivation - iLc; recovery 
in the post-Communist e ra is u form of emancipation. Even in Yugoslavia, 
where the connict of confronted national interests escl-llatcu into a long 
anti bloody war, the emergence of the new nation-sta tes is a logical con-
sequence nf the coUap e of cnmmunism. The national issue "was neces-
sarily revived after the collapse of Communism, since Communist regimes 
repressed every autonomy, including that of national groups. Can long-re-
pressed mtlions be blamed fo r cunnecting freedom with independence?"7 
The implication is clear: the narion-buikling process in the rcc.;cnt history 
of Eastern Europe doesn't a lways mean the revival of extreme forms nf 
nationaJj m. or course, the cbauvinixtic and militant, violent forms of na-
tionalism are po,·l-;hJc too. It depend un the historical circnm\tances 
which form will prevail. Tht: newly established political plorali m in-
cludes the recognition of all interests existing in a society. National inter-
~.;s ts have a lready exi.stctl. Communist dictatorships tried to suppress the 
free expression of national inte rcsL'i. Therefore, the new tlemocracies inevi-
tably include rhe revival of national interests and effortS to complete na-
tion-sLate. . The whole problem cannot be solved hy suppression of na-
tionalism. However, the control of the transition process and cstabli bment 
of democratic principlcs could be a realistic solution. 
S For the onglll of the theory of historic uud non-historic nations und its 
application to the present developments in Eastern Europe, ~ee: Sugar, I'. F., 
"ExtemaJ and Domel>Lic Roots of E.1srem Europcuu :--l'ationalism' ', in: Sugar, P.F. 
and I. Lederer (eds.), Natinnlliism io Easrem Europe. University of Washington 
Press, Seaule and London, 1994, P- 21. 
6 [bid., p. JO. 
7 lvo Bauac, "lntroduction" to the book: Bannc, lvo (ell.), Enstem Eumpc m 
Rc:volutioo. C.omell Univcr:.it:y Press, l lhAca, N.Y. und London, 1992, p. J I. 
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The Break-up of Yugoslavia .1nd the Di incegrativn of Post-
Communir;t Fcdt.mttions 
The West is embarra'>'>ed '"'ith the developments in Eastern Europe. 
The idea of nation-state in tJH: po t-Communi.'>L countries ernl:TT~ed as a 
quite oppol\ite tendency in comparison with the proces!> nf integration of 
West Europe. 
The post-Cummuoist period in the East di.,played the revival of the 
1dea of nation-state. The concept of a nution-state is nul very old in the 
West, either. The nineteenth century was the time of the t!mergcnce of 
national mowments and creation of nation-states in Europe. With th~: 
exception of Great Brilitin and FraJI(:c, all other wc.'>l European uations 
e~tahlished their mttlon-states in 1he nineteenth cenrury. In four of the 
frve wars taking place in Europe berweeu JR..-;9 and 1871 the creation of 
nation-!>tates was the main issue. Italy estabUshed its nniry between 1859 
and 1871. Germany did the sarne during the Prench-German war 1870-
1871. The contemporal) USA federation was created after the civil war 
1861-186). The creation of France as a nation-o.;lale was a pmduct of 
the Great Rcvohnion of 1789. The F rench celebrated its 200th anniversary 
as rect:ntly as six yt:ars ago. The Ru~ian Empire, with the s;um: size as 
tmlay's Russicu1 Federation, wa~ created only 150 years ago. 
The:: foundation of the:: Austrian-Hungarian monarchy in 1867 wa.~o <~lso 
the creation of Aul\trian and Hung<~rian nation-sla tes. The Austrian-Hun-
garian monarchy at the same lime blockud the estabJj::;hm ent of nation-
states of the other nation in the dm•l monarchy. For example, the Diric 
Movement ( 1835-1848), which was lhe Cruatian National Renaissance, 
failed to c'>t.ahbsh Croatian mdependc:nL'C, bu t tbc: Croatian-Hungari;m 
treaty nf l868 proviucd Croatia with more politiC<Jl rights than the other 
naUnns in the uual monarchy had. 
The cunclusi<.)n coulu he that the hi'>tory of nation-states is rdatively 
recent phenomenon. In the post-Communist pt:riod easl-Europcan nations 
only resumed the process blocked by the multi-national states m the niuc-
teenth century, and by the Warsaw pact and Communist federations in 
the twentieth century. 
The dissolution of post-Communist federations is the r~wnptioo of the 
proces: e.., interrupted hy the long pt.!riod of Communisr rule. The ·ituation 
is complicated by the fact that 50 or 70 years of Commu nism intended to 
create "a new society" wh~re anything connected with the previou'> civili-
zation was destroyt.:tl. The post-Communist umnrries are now passing 
thrnugh the same processes as the West, but 150- 200 yc;~rs later. Every-
thing is the same, except I hat the countries and time differ. Jt stands to 
reason that some uations use tht:: opportunity lo establish their own na-
tion-stales and to complete the proce~' of nalion-buikling. 
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Therefore, it isn't a very wise conclusion that the West is undergoing 
an integration process and that tin.: East is headed in quite the opposite 
direction. They are both going toward the same destination, but not at 
the same tim!.! ami not in the same manner. 
The West is going to be much more integrated then ever. The truth i3 
that the East is going to be completely disintegrated. However, the inte-
gration of the West is the res11 ll of s llt:ees.~oJul econnmit:s, interests, and 
the freedom of choice. The integration of the Communist federations has 
been lmseu 011 the political voluntarism, the absence of economic rational-
itY and nondemocratic decisions. Therefore, no one in the East, with the 
eiception of the Serbian and Russian nationalists, wants the return of 
old Communis t integrations. The new forms of integrations are acceptable. 
J\11 east Europeans want to become the members of the Ell. 
The Western federations are much more durable then those in the 
East. The Western federations have been the result of tht: loug lasting 
expansion of the marke.t economy. The USA is a classic example. In c.on-
trast, the uniting stuff of Lht Communist federations was nothing else but 
political power. lienee, the collapse of Communist power was the simulta-
neous collapse of federations. 
The multi-national federations are justified only if the nations involved 
have au interest to be together. In politics only interests are eternal. 
Huwever, ethni~,; cnrnrnuuities havt: lost any interests to live together in 
the old Communist federations. This has not been the crisis of the Soviet 
or Yugoslav or Czechs and Slovaks federation. Tl1is has been the crisis of 
I he idea of mil IIi-e thnic sla.tcs in lhc post-Communist societies. Aud the 
disease has been terminal. 
Marke t reforms, democratization, a11d decentralization in the former 
Communist c.ountries were inseparable components of the same process. 
Hence, it was impossible to welcome the end of Communism, democracy 
and Lhc market reforms ami try to save tht: multi-ethnic federations at 
the same time. 
In Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union democratization and the 
market reforms were followed hy decentralization and stronger power of 
federal units. The Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was at the same time eco-
nomic decentralization, democratization, and the suspension of persecution 
of alleged mttionalists. The Prag11e Spring of J968 brought the first ele-
ments of federalism in Czechoslovakia. After the Velvet Revolution of 
1989 the deve lopment of federalism went on in the same direction. The 
federation even changed its name (The Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic) just to demonstrate the equality of the two federal units. At the very 
beginning llf perestroil<a Gorbachev announced the slren~rthening of power 
of the federa l republics and the autonomy of their party organizations. 
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Democratitatioo in Yugo!.lavia, after the r~moval of vice-president ami 
the long time police chief Rankovic in 1966, was followed by the tlucen-
tnlli7Attion of the Party and the tlevolution of federal powers to republics. 
ln 1969 the principle of democratic cemm1i5tn was partly derogated in the 
Yugoslav Comrnun~ t Pany. The autunomy of republic's pany org;mizations 
created the federal-confederal structure in the Yugoslav Communist Party 
(The League of Communists of Yugmhtvia).ll Con:.titutional amendments 
of J971 and Tito's 1974 constitution introdut."t:d confederal components in 
the Yugoslav federation ju ·t to demonstrate the new tronger power of 
repuhJjcs. lt was cvirtem that the introduction of political pluralism, even 
in a very rudimentary form, includes the legitimization nf national interest 
too. 
The Communi:.t countri~s hat! highly centr.ilized economiu:.. The ruling 
party, which controlled the state and the economy, was extremely centntl-
izetl with its priudple of democratic centralism, too. Uoth of them were 
the main cohesive forces of the former Communist federations., especiaUy 
the party. With the market reform., centralized economy ceased tu exist. 
And the break Jown of Communist parties wmc a t the same time the end 
of federal states. lt means that the brcuk down of the CPSS in August 
1991 was tbe actual end of the Soviet federation. The meeting of repub-
lics' leaders in December 1991 was only a formal proclamation that the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist. lt was the same with the Yugoslav federa-
tion. The collapse of the Yuguslav League uf Communil L' at its 14th 
Congress in January 1990 was the death of the federal <;tare, too. The in-
ternational recognitiou nf the new :.nccessor state' in January 1992 was 
the decision of the EC to break diplomatic rchttions with the dead politi-
cal entity - Yugoslav statc. 
Therefore, alJ miliLary conllicts in former Yugo lavia after January 1991 
were not '"civil wars" but only interstate wars with an obvious aggn:.·sor 
- Serbja. 
Centralism was the ideological hias of Communist hard-liners. Universal-
ism was essential in the Communist movement. The cure of that univer-
salism was the idea of world revolution. The whole Communist movement 
was highly centrali~ed with Moscow as the Communist Vatican. All the 
li l'he Communist party as a smgle ruling party in a multi-ethnic federation 
essentiaUy diminished lbc meaning of federation. Carl J. l-riedrich bas explained 
the point: "/\. great deal depends upon tltc degree of ~clf-restntint which the 
ComnmH.i:.l l'any will exercise in tbe deployment o( iiS concenliatcu power. In 
lbc Sovie t Union, there is liLLie evidence of :,uch self-reslrdint.: the federcLI order 
bas therefore, in spite of certain operational aspects, largely remained a facade 
for a ceotrnlizcd political order.~ (Friedrich, C.J., Trend~· of Federnh:m1 in Theory 
ancl Pracrice, Frederic A Prnegcr l'ublishers, New York ell:., 1961:l , p. J 68.) Hut 
in former Yugoslavia the Communist Party developed certain fcdcral-confederal 
traits in 1969 and thus lbe Yugoslav federation was able 1:0 become a real 
federation with the fonhcoming ronl>limtional changes. 
CorotlJI~ 8 .. The B< .. k-up of Formm YugoslaVJa -· l'ollt. mlsao, Vol. XXXI!, (1WS), No. 5. pp 130 148 137 
Communi. t parties were extremely centralized nn tbe bases of the so 
called principle of democratic centmli rn . Tbe highly centralized organiza-
tion of the single ruling party produced t:cntralization of Communist fed-
erations in spite of their decentralized constitutional structure. 
This can explain why the last days of C'.ummuoism were marked by the 
struggle of hard-line Communists to save the fetlcnltions. That stmggle 
was actually an cffurt of Communist p}Jrty elite to rett~in tJu: monopoly of 
power. The Communist hard-liners felt that decentraliz.1tion anti shift of 
authority to republics could be terminal loss of power. Stalinists have aJ-
wayJo. considered the idea of decentralizati\m extremely danger\lU. . For ex-
ample, the principle of polycentrism, proclaimed by the Italian Communist 
leader Togliatti, w<ts subjected to harsh criticism. Communi.'il hard-liners in 
Yugoslavia considered thc 1974 constitution witb strong confcderal ele-
ments unncccptable. ln the summer of 1991 Moscow'!> Stalinists c.oncluded 
that the new Union Treaty, which aimed ro establish the Union of Sov-
ereign Republics. could hift power to republiC\ and therefore the) fell 
that the new <.:nnl\litutional solution was dangerous. Their response was a 
cuup d'etat. 
I fis tory Lh..:monstrated that centralism and decentralization was a crucial 
line of division hclween Communist hard-liners and supporter!. of democ-
racy and the market reforms. The consequent conclusion was, that any at-
tempt to s:.we tJ1e Communist fecler.tlions was practically an endeavour to 
save the power of die-hard Communists. 
The maintennnce of federations was not interest of Communist hard-
liners only. Those whose surviva l dep~.:nded on the exll;tencc of central 
(federal) bodies shared the same interests: federaJ bureaucracy, police, 
military, and the underdeveloped repubJjcs depending un federaJ aid_ In 
the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia the army command taff was 
trcmgly against any degree of decentralization. In former Yugoslavin '\uch 
policy wHs l>upported by the nntlcrdeveloped federal units: Serbia, Monte-
negro, and at the heginniog, Bosnia iind Macedonja_!l In the former So-
viet Union the underdeveloped Muslim republics supported centralism 
practic.aDy to lhc last days of the Soviet federation. 
Civil society and the market economy havl! been the centripetal furce1 
of Western federations. On the other band, the Jack of civil society has 
been the common his tory of bastem Eurnpe.10 The cohesive intlucnce of 
9 Macedonia anti Bosnia-Herzegovina have later changecl their altitude. The 
danger of Serbian centralism was mucb bigger than lhe los~ of federal aid. That 
dilemma of the umlenleveloped repuhlics in the ixties bas been pointed out by 
Dennison Rusinow (Rusinow. D., 7ht: Yugoslav Experiment 1!).18-1974. C. Hursr 
aud Co. for rhe Royal Institute of Lnremauonal Affairs, London. 1977, pp. 135-
136). 
JO On weak or non-existent civil society in Eastern Europe between the World 
Wars, sec: Scboptlin, George, Politics in lia.slcro Europe 1945-1992, Bh.td:weU 
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the marke t economy w·..t~ impossible, Lou: the Communi),! countries diu not 
have market at aU. 1 hat was the essential difference between Lhc Western 
countrit:s and Uastern Europe. 
From the Western standpoint it was not so ell ;y tO understunu that 
the market reforms in the Ea t did not produce any intc!,'T<~tive potential. 
Jm.t the opposite . The first stepl> roward the market economy in the 
Communist countries had an extreme dissolution power. Tht: introduction 
of marke t competition dcmonstrated obvious development rlifferenc~. The 
underdeveloped fetle ral republics were less able to compete and lc.'" will-
mg to acct:pt the radical tum toward the market principle..... Later, these 
int:qualities led to increasingly diffcwnt pojjtical iutcmsts and confrunt<t-
tions. The und~rdeveloped federal units wanted a pem1nnent distribution 
o f financial aid. That included centralizatiun and the delay of the markcl 
reforms. On the other side, the moo;t developed unit considered that they 
would establish the market ccunomy and beL·ome the members of the EC 
sooJJ~..:r, if they were independent. 
The difference." between the develop~d and the underdeveloped repub-
lics in former Yugoslavia were extremely ),ignificanL They were bigger than 
the differences between the EC members. The differences, supported by 
n:~tionalisls, developed i1110 an unbridgeable politic"! gap. The case of 
Serbia wao; instructive. Serbia was an underdevelopeu republic of former 
Yugoslavia but a politicalJy powerful unit. Serbian economy was too weak 
for a radic.1l shift toward the market economy and it could not survive 
without leveling corrections of federal alllhorities. Serbia wanted centTaliza-
tion and the uclay of the m<trket reforms. Wltcn Serbia faih.:d to realize 
its intere:-1 by political mc~1ns, the continuation of the -;arne polky w<t<; 
the war (Ciausewirz) against Kosovn. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia - an 
a t1empt to revive centralized Yugoslavia or to conquer te rritories for 
Greater Serbia. 
The Causes of Recent Serbian Nationali 111 
There is no doubt that the war raging in former Yugoslavia has been 
a Serbian war. It is not a civil war bccause Serbian state's leaden-hip 
planned. organized, funril'hed and suppon ed the war in every poSSible way 
in all pans of former Yugoslavia. Serbia eradicated autonomy of Serbian 
provinces Kosuvo aod Vojvuuina (Kosovo was occupied hy federal army 
and by Serbian units lale r). Serbian leadership organized a coup u'etat in 
Montenegro. This former federal republic of previous Yugo),lav federation 
is nothing but a simple administrative unit in the new Serbian conLrnlled 
Publisht:rs, Cambridge, MA, 1993, pp. 5-37: Rollis~.:hilci, Joseph, Reruro to 
Diversity: A Political Hi:>tury of JiaSJ CeutnJl Europe Since World W.u D, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York. 1993, pp. 3-24. 
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federation in spite of its formal status of federal republic. Serbian policy 
pushed the former federal army (YPA) into the war against Slovenia. 
Serbian leadership subsequently pushed lht: YPA LO take control of the 
future borders of Serbian areas in Croatia and llosnia, to distribute arms 
among eth nic Serbs in both states, and to attack Croatian and Bosnian 
towns and villages. Serbia organized nprioings of eth nic Serbs in Croatia 
and Bosnia. Serbia tried to do the same in Macedonia but for the time 
being SerhiaJt leaders haven't pulled the trigger. Serbia has supplied the 
Serbian side in Croatia and Bosnia with weapons, officers, military units, 
oil, food, political leaders. 
All observers and poJitic<1l analysts could agree tha1 Serbian nationalism 
has been the most important force generating the war. This is not the 
war originated by ;.mcient Serbian nationalism. New cause:-. produced the 
explosion of new Serbian nationalism. They can be found in the tottering 
Serbian economy faced with the market reforms. 
Serbian frustrations the e<.:onomic reforms and the introdut:tion of mar-
ket principles produc.ecl a politie<tlJy explosive situation consi.de1ing the fact 
that Serbia was an underdeveloped but politically strong republic with the 
YP A support. By the beginning of the sixties Serbia felt deprived with the 
first steps of the market economy in Yugoslavia. Serbian response was an 
aLLcmpt to tlilute reforms. Scrhia demanded centntlization instead of de-
centralized consequences of the market refom1s. Serbia formed the conser-
vative bloc together witl1 the other underdevdopt!d republics. 
The leader of the bloc was fede ral vice-president Alexander l{ankovic, 
who controlled the political police for a long time. Rankovic confronted 
Tito. Presidt:nl Titu finally dt:featcd Rankuvic in 1966. 11 The next Serbian 
attempt were protest meetings of Belgrade's students against social differ-
ences and unemployment il1 196H. It was the extreme left movement prn-
testillg agaiust tht: cunsc4ut:nccs of the market reforms. The implication 
WHl~ cleiir: the denunciation of the market economy as n capitalist devia-
tion. Anti-market attitude bas been constant fea ture of Serbian policy with 
only one exception. The Serbian liberals, Marko Nikezic and Latinka 
Perovic (the leaders of Serbia 1968-1972) had an explicit pro-market 
stand.12 
The document prepared by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 1\rts, 
the so called Memorandum (19H6), was the programme of recent Serbian 
nationalism and president Miluikvic himsdf. Memo-Memorandum had an 
explicit anti-market attitude. Authors of the document wrote that the pe-
riod between 1953- 1965, the era of command Soviet- type economy in 
Yugoslavia, was "a period of successful development". "Patal turning-point" 
11 s~~= Rusinow, ibid., pp. 135-no and ll:W-11)3. 
12 See: Bilandiic, D., Histnr!/a SF/<.!. Clavni pmcesi !918-7Y85, Skolska knjiga, 
Zagreb, 1985, p. 519. 
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was the market reform of 1965. By then developed republics had domi-
nated, and Serbian acquisitions were social differences and unemployment. 
Therefore, the conclusion was that the whnlc l965 pro~ect of liberalization 
uf economy was ''R wrong strategic turning-point'' .1 In consequence, 
Milo5evic's le<~dersbip accepted the market economy only formaJiy, and op-
posed any consequen t realization of market principles.l4 
Economic fTustrations provoked enormous rise of Serbian nationalism. 
The next issue was Yugoslav federalism. The constitution of 1974 was 
faced with harsh criticism of Serbian scholars and politicians. After Tito's 
death the constitution of 1974 was the primary target of Serhiao nationaJ-
ism. l'i T he point was decentralization, which shifted con:-;iderable p ower lo 
the republic.'\ and, particularly, the new sta tus of autonomous provinces. 
Vojvotlim1 and Kosovo, the multi-ethnic pnwinces of Serbia, had a federal 
\latus practically equal tO that of rcpublics.16 atiunalistS considered 1 hat 
such a clmnge impaired Lhe 'overeignty of Serbia . T he so Cltllcd " lllue 
Book" on provinces ( 1977) demanded restoration of Serh i~m integrity. Tito 
rejected the itlca. 
After Tiro 's death ( 19 0) the first objectives of the organized Serbian 
nalilmalist campaign were Kosovo and the attempt to curb Albanians. 
With M ilosevic at the helm, Serbian nationalism became am,rressive. Ser-
bian leatlcrship tried tu overtake the control over the Yugoslav party. 
Milul;evic managed LU convene an nun-regular Pany' ' Congres. The Slo-
venes and Croats opposed tJu; Serbtan endeavour. Hence, the only effects 
of the 14th Congres. or the League of Yugoslav Communists were !be 
13 See: ''Memorandum" SA~"'U. in: I?VOri "'1::/ilwsrpske agresijr:. August Cesarec, 
Skols J...a knJiga. Zagreb, 1991, pp. 257-258, 263, 213, 275-276, m 284. 
14 Griffiths, who accepted many pro-Serb '·urguments", uud a Nimilar opinion 
nboul Milnsevic: "Miloscvic, n communili l a'l weU as a ualionalist, also refused to 
~ive economic reform, as dcmandec1 by the Western-oriented republics Slovenia 
ami Croatia, any kind of priority ... ~ Griffiths, Stephen lwao, Notionahsm ttDd 
Ethnic Cunflict: Threats tu European Secunly (SIPR.l Research Heport illo. 5), 
Stockholm lJlteruationa l l'eace Research ln~titu te, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
nod New York, 1993. p. 42. 
15 "The fm.L auacks again'oL the constitution of 197•1 were launched in 198l, 
notably in the theses of the Central Committee of ll1e League of Cornmunisls of 
erbia (SKS), which included claims that Serbia was the o nly republic nor 
constitmed as a sta te due to the disruptive role uf the autonomous province.s." 
(Magas, Brunka, Tbe Destruction nf Yugoslavia: TrackiDg the 1/reak-up 1980-92, 
Ver:;a, London and New York, 1993, p. 175.) 
The M emorandum of the Serbian Academy of Scieocclt and Arts directed itJ; 
sharpest attacks nt the 1974 constitu tion, too. See: Zametica, John, The Yugoslav 
C.onllicL, The lntcrnatiouul Instintte for Strategic Studies, Lo nd0n, 1992, p. 21. 
16 The arne coudusion on the 1974 constitution ilisuc can be found m 
Griffilhs, op. ciL, p. 41. 
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break-up of the federal party and collnp:-e of Communism in the country. 
After that failed endeavour, Scrbinn leadership tried to grasp contro l over 
the federaJ ta le. When that failed, U1c wai became the only possible way 
to itchieve the Serbian nationalists' goals. The aim. were very clear-t:ut: to 
conquer the whole Yugoslavia ami establish a centralized '\Late, or to grab 
liS much te rritory as JX'''ihle and establish Grc<llcr Serbia. 
The main Serbian ally was the YPA. /\t the beginning of the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia the former federal army wa.'l divided into two factions: 
the first, formally pro-federal, and the second, pro-Serbian. But former 
disappeared, and lhe latter prevailed. t7 The YPA had aln~ady become 
the tool of Serbian nationalist policy in Kosovo . ince in the early e ighties. 
Acting out'>ide all constitutional provisions and in defiance of the civilian 
authorities, t he YPA Marted the war again!>L Slovenia. a part nf Yugoslav 
fedemtion. That was actually an a ttempt of mili tary coup organized in full 
co-ope ration with Serbian leaders hip. In Croatia the YP A was entirely a 
Sl!rbiao forc.e.tl! 
The YPA preparations fo r fulure Serbian wa rs were made much ear-
lier. ln 1980 the YPA took over the control of the Territorial D efense, a 
military organization which had previously been under the decentntlizcd 
control of federal republie5.. Oppo iog the break-up uf Yugoslavia, the 
YP/\ introduced (1988) a new te rrito ria l organization of anny districts, 
which e limjnated the congruity of army district honlcn; with the border; 
of federa l rl!publics.t9 During lhe prepa ra tions for the war Slovenian and 
Croatian units (in Slovenia and Croatin) were transferred and replaced hy 
more n:liable Serbian units, anu ethnic clean aH-Serh pa ratroop unjts were 
formed. w In May 1990 the YPA confi-;cated the weapons of lhc Territo-
rial D efense in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. 
17 The YI'A had the same ohjeclivcs as S~;r bino nationa lism. Of t:ourse, 
motiws varied. The ~~rmy tried to save the federation bct:ause the fede ral 
administrotion and fcdcrul pw-ty were its employers. The YPA tried 1.0 establish u 
military party: the L.eague of \.ommunil.!!.-Movement for Yugoslavia iu November 
1990. The purpose was dear. The army tried to regenerate its employer. 
18 During the wru in Slovenia " ... the JNA ( the YPA) was seen and treated as 
sut:b by the population as un invading, foreign (Serbiuo) force and wa.~ 
bumilia tec1. I he war then moved on to Croatia. Here tbe army, by uow 
effectively having disctHcled the fig leaf of ostensibly heing 11 Yugoslav institution 
and now clearly ami unkedly a Serbian force ... " (Poulton, Hugh, The Balkum·: 
Minoritic:s 81Jd SLtJtes in Cnnflicl, Minority Rights Publications, London. 1993, p. 
211) 
19 Oo concentration of military power in the bt1nds of feder.tl army bodies, 
see: Gow, James, Legitimacy nod the /l111uary: Tht.: Yugoslav Crisis., PinLer 
Publishers, I 992, pp. 95-99. 
20 See: Poulton, ibid., p. 100. 
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The pro-Serh :otance of federal army could be explained with the fact 
that the YPA was dominated by a predominanrly Serb officer staff. The 
e thnic distribution of the 60,000 officer corps in early 1991 wa.' ~ts follows: 
Serbs 60 percent; "a further 5.4 per cent were 'Yugoslavs' and likely tn 
he Serbs:" Montt:nchrrins 6.2 per cent: "Cro;u , 12.6 per cenl ; Macedoni-
ans, 6.3 per cent; Muslims, 2.4 per cent; Slovenes, 2.8 per cent ; Albani-
ans, 0.6 per cent; Hungarians, 0.7 per cent; utbers, 1.6 per ctnt."21 
The pulitical posirion of the YPA is evident from <t document tided 
Information on dJt~ Curn:nt Intemaciooal 011d Domestic Situation and the 
Forthcoming Ta.\h of the YP1\, which W'~ prepared by tbt: political ad-
minis tration nf lhe Ministry of Defense and released a!. lhe document of 
the Federal Council of National Defense at rhe end of January 1991. 
Briefly, the document was extremely anti-Western. The YPA luaclers were 
encouragctl hy the growing strength of Soviet cons~rvalives at the !!nd of 
1990, whereby " the process of disintegration of this great country has 
been slowed tlown." Po htical planncf' of the YPA Jc::muno;trated ns Rus-
sian cunnection: "The Soviet Army is also being mobilized. This develop-
ment of the situation in the USSR, irr~;:~pective of where it may lead, 
limits the Wcsl' · freedom of aclion and scope for influencing worltl 
evenL-;. ln Yugoslavia too, '\Ucialism has not ycL heen finished off, brought 
to its knees. Yugoslavia has managed to withstand, albeit at a high cost, 
the first atlltck and wave of anti-Communist hy!<!tcria. Real prospt:cb. of 
mainhtining the country a.., a federa te and 'Ocialist community have been 
preserved ... "22 
The Scrhian nationalist policy had been planned many yea rs t:ttrlie r. 
Memorandum of Lhc Serbian Academy ( 19R6) proclain1ed thai the integrity 
of the Serbian nation in Yugol-lavi<t was the crucial i · ·ue of its e:illtcm.'C. 
The document also empha.,ized that the ~olution of the national issue of 
the Serbs in Croat ia was the most imponant political i sue of the day.:!> 
21 Gow, Jumcs, op. cil. p. 142. The shnrc of Se1bs in the "rmy staff was 
even more cli~proportiouutc before lhe Secom.l Worlrl War: " •.. iu 1938. of 165 
General!>. 161 were Serhs - lcaviu~ two t'ronts and two Slovenes: · (Tomru.cvich. 
Jot:o, Pea.<;;~nt. Politic:. aocl Economic CbtuJJlc: in Yugnslavia. SwnforJ Uni\ Press. 
Stanford. 1955, p. 261) 
22 KOS, the Army counlcr-intelligeocc servir.e, made ull preparations for 
miliLary coup in Croatia. At the end of January 1991, the Army wn:. put on full 
alert Croatia npp~urcd on 1hc brink of iuvasion. ln the evc.:ut, nothrng bappcnetl . 
The YPA hacl no courage lo slart \vitb the coup. The text of army document 
and explanation of circumstances com:crning rhe YPJ\ role in Yugoslav crisis, :;cc: 
Mug!cl, Branka, op. cit. pp. 26N-272: &nuc. Tvo (cd.). E&tc:m l::.llrnpe in 
Revolucioo. Ithaca, •. Y., Londou. ComeiJ University Pres!i. 1992. p. 183. 
23 In 1ll86 Lbe Serbl. in Croatia were overrepresented in Croatian politics. Fo1 
instance, the prcsiueut of the Central Committee of lhc Croatiau League of 
Communist wa~ an ethnic Serb, us well as the editor-in-chief of the maiu 
Croalian daily Vje:,tJik, the general manager of Zagreh'c; radio amJ TV, lhc chief 
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Serbia's new (1990) constitution claims the right to intervene in all Yugo-
slav republics and provinces with the Serbian minority. .1\.:nd President 
Milnsevic has open ly anti mpeatctlly cntlMsctl non-wnslilulional anti 
violent fo rms of political change in Yugoslavia. On 25 June 1990 MlJosevic 
issued a warning that current republican borders were only adm.in.istrative 
borders, connected with federa l Yugoslavin. ln case of confecleral 
transformation , or separation, the question of Serbia's borders would be 
an open political issue. 
The Serbian politi.cal opposition shared MiJosevic 's view. For many of 
them, the westem borders nf Serbia nught ln be drawn in such a way 
that mucb of present-day Croatia would be a part of Grea ter Serbia.24 
By the way, according to a ll federal constitutions, Yugoslavia's republics 
havl! not been adminislralivl! units but nation-states and their borders 
were not drawn ad hoc, but on the basis of e thn.ic and historic consid-
era tions. No border could be changed except by ag1·eement with the fetl-
l!ral r!.!puhlics concem ed.25 
Milosevic proclaimed Memorandum 's policy as official policy o f Serbia : 
a ll Serbs mw;t livl! in the sa me stat e.21i H ence, MiJosevic offered to non-
Serbian republics to choose between the federation under Serbian control 
and tl1e creation of Greater Serbia at the !.!xpt:nsc.; of territorial integrity 
of the other republics. This policy was practically a declaration of war. 
The Serbian media tried to blame a ll o ther sides for the war. For in -
stanc.;c, the inlrntluclion of the traditional Croatian tJag and the coat of 
arms was seen by the Serbs as allegedly a revival of Croatian fascists 
symbols.27 The Serbian propaganda teutled to overestimate the number of 
of secret service etc. Mihailo Crnobmja, Serb himself, confirnt~ll Llmt: "Iu Croutiu 
... the Serbs were if anything overrepresenred in rn~ ny significant walks of life: in 
politics, the media, the poHce, the army. The backlash ugain:.l Lh~ imbalance was 
later to become a part of the prohlern. None the tess, the Serbs· rela tively larger 
representation can be explained, if not justifieu." (Cruobmja, Mibailo, The 
Yugoslav Dra.m,'l. London, New York, LB.Tauris Publishers, 1994, p. 96). 
2•1 For iostauce, Mihuilo Crnubrnja, who wouldn' t accept that he is a Serhian 
nationalist and follower of Milosevic, demand the same: "Some border correctious 
shoulu be st:riously contcmplalcu." Ibid., p. 264. 
25 The Conclusion of the Arbitrariao Commission of LIJ.c Europt:an Community 
Coo.ft:rt:ncc o n Yugoslavia (so called Badinter's Commission) was that "Yugoslavia 
as a state is in a state of dissolutiou" whicb included the recognition of internal 
borden; as lhc bo rders of the new independent states (December 1991). 
26 See: Zamt: tica, John, The Yugoslav ConOict, op. cit., 1992, pp. 20-22. 
(Lametica is <l n echoic Se rb, not John but Jovan, and uow be is working for the 
Bosnian Serbs' lcaucr KaradZic) 
27 Of course, the Croatian fascist.~ symbols were different (letter ''U"). Croatia 
has alwRys had some constant parts of national symbols - but those have not 
been fascists (for i.nstancc chess-hoard in the coat of arms). !'hose symbols have 
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Serbian victims in the Second World WaT killed by Croatian fascists. The 
intention was obvious: the new Cruati;m state could repeat the massacre 
and therefore the uprising of Serbs in Croatia i",;; legirimate. They claim 
that 700,000 of Scrhs were killed in the Ustasba concentration ca mp at 
Jasenovac (Croatia) alone. According to one of the most reliable Serbian 
authority Bogoljuh KoceviC, the actual wartime losses suffered hy the 
main Yugoslav narionalities were al-l fulJows (in thousands) : 
Serbs 487 Moslem s 86 
Croats 207 M acedonians 7 
Slovenes 32 AJbaoianx 6 
Mcmtenegrins 50 (Jews) (60) 
Concerning the share of population, the Jews suffered tbc mo ·t , then 
the Moslems (8.1 per cent), Lbt! Serbs (7.3 per cent) and Croats (5.0 per 
ccnt).28 
The con nicts with the new government in Croatia cou ldn' t be blamed 
for the uprising of Serhl> in Croatia. The Serh' started and sharpened the 
confronta tion. 29 
The Scrhian "uprising'' in Croatia, as well a!. Lhe Serbian war in Bo-
snia, is aimed at conque ring as much te rritory as possible for the emerg-
ing Greater Scrhia. That was not an attempt to protect o r " to liberate" 
e thnic Scrh living there. The Serbian war goals are the te rritories with a 
very small o r non-existing Serbian minority. Ethnic cleansing ha been the 
main instrument for the implementa tion o f Serbian policy as well as mas..<; 
killing.-;, mass rapes and the displacement of more than 2 milljnn non-
Scrhs.10 
been the same in the Communist Croatia and in tbe contemporary independent 
state. 
28 For more detail!!, see: Maga5, B1 aul u. op. cil., p. 315. 
29 "Whatever criticism can be made of Lhe Croatian government's tn.:almenr of 
the Serb mino• ity, there h:we been few signs of systematic persecution, certai.uly 
not of the kind suffered by the national minorities in MiloseviC's Serbia." (Magas, 
ihld . p. 316). 
30 l::.lhnic cleansiug "of non-Serb populations from Serb-conquered areas was 
not just a by-product of the fighting, but belonged 10 its central purpose.~ 
Malcolm, Noel, op. ciL, p. 8. 
"TI1ere is sufficient evidence to conclude that the practice of 'ethnic cleAnsing' 
were not coincidental, sporadic or ca rried out by disorganized groups or buntls of 
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The Serhian military tried to conquer the o ld Croatian town Dubrovnik 
with practically no Serbs living there (only 6% ). They destroyed Vukovar, 
once a town of 50,000 inhabitants, with 43 per cent of Croats, '37 per 
cent of Serbs, 20 per cent of Hungarians and others. The whole a rea of 
Eastern Slavonia, which Serbia probably intended to include in its state 
territory, had a LOLH I population of 647,853 inhabitants in 1991. The ethnic 
composition of Eastern Slavonia was as follows: 66 per cent Croat, 14.4 
per cent Serb, and 19.6 per cent ntl1ers (mainly Hungarians). The pari of 
Eastern Slavonia occupied by Serbs (the last occupied territory in Croatia) 
had 194,~09 inhabitants in 1991 (~7,051 or 45 per cent Croats; 67,878 or 
34,8 per cent Serbs; 39,880 or 20,5 per cent Hungarians and others). It 
shouJd be also noted that the territory bas never been part of the Ser-
bian state. lu all territories m:cupiet.l hy Scrhs in Croatia (according to the 
census of 1991) lived 549,083 inhabitants on 3 January 1992. Ethnic pic-
ture was as follows: Croats 203,656 (37, 1% ); Serbs 287,830 (52,4% ); others 
57,597 ( 10,5% ). After Serbian occupalion non-Serbs have practically disap-peared.3~ 
I\ similar pattern was repeated in Bosnia a nt.! Ht!rzegovina. The Serbs 
claimed 65% nf territory. However, ethnic composition was disproportion-
ate in relation to Serbian demands: 45% Bosniacs (Moslems), 31% Serhs, 
17% Croats.32 
The result of the Serbian war in fom1er Yugoslavia bas been appalling: 
more than 2,000,000 persons have been displaced, about 200,000 killed, 
with mass rares and with the destruction Of e.nOrnlOUS number Of towns 
and villages.3 The international community tried to slop the war but 
civilians who could uot be l:Onlrolled by the Bosnian-Serh leadership.'' The 
patterns of conduc1, the manner, the Ienght of time, and the areas i.n wbkh they 
occurred "combim: to revcul a purpose, systematicity and some planning and 
coordination from higher authorities... and indicate the exislenl:t: of un clement of 
superior uirt:l:t.ion... With respect to the practices hy Serbs in Bosnia and 
llerzegovi.na and Croatia, ethnic cleansing is commonly used as a term to 
uc~cribc a policy conducted in furthera nee of political doctrines relating to 
'Greater Serbia."' See: rmal Report of the: Commission of Experts b:~tahlished 
PUiswmt to Security Council l?eso!ution 780 (1992) (so called Bassiuoni's Report 
to the Security Council of LIJc Unitcu Nations), May 1994, p. 33-35. 
31 There was an estimation tbat only 5% of oon-Scrbs lived in the so called 
Serbian Krajinu in Croatia. (Maga8, H., ibid., pp. 3U-313; Sterc, Stjepan, anti 
Nenad Pokos, " Demogra!Ski uzroci i posljedil:c ruta proliv Hrvatske", /Jru.~tvena 
isr.r<divanja, No. 4-5, 1993, pp. 305-319, ~22-32K) 
32 See: Magas, ibid., p. 226; Griffiths, ibiJ., p. 52. 
33 "The territory over which most of lhe victimization ol:currcd had a 
population base of an estimated 6 million persons, of whom 1.5 to 2 million are 
now refugees ... Most of lbc:m were dcporlcu or forced to leave and are unable 
to return. The civilian and military casualties among all warring factions urc 
reported to exceed 200,000. The number of reported mass graves, 150.. . rends to 
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failed. The We ' tern democracies w~re nor ready to take the side. No one 
could "top a fascist type war only by diplomatic means. To stop the war 
in former Yugo lavitt meant opposing the aggressor. 
We em asree with Not:l Malcolm that "thi!\ war will only end by mili-
tary means."34 That does not mean only military defeat of the aggressor. 
NATO pi.!acemaking operation could establish peace too - if IFOR 





<;uppon the estimate'\ of the number of ca.sualt:i~. Over 7110 prison t."Umps And 
detention faci lities arc reported to have existed... The 1 npc and sexual assault 
s tudy uml invesrig;nion... suggests a very high number of rnpcs an<.l sexunl 
as•mulrs in custo<.liuJ and noo-custodinl selling«. Thus, earlier projection of 20,000 
rapes rnudc hy other sources are not uweusonable considering the numher of 
actual reported cases:· (!mal Report of the Commission nf H:rpc:rts Estublishr::d 
Pur~uanl tn Security Counc11 !(e. n/ution 780 ( 1992), op. cit., p. 84). 
The recent report issued by Lhc C IA hlamed the Scrhian side for 90 per cenl 
of war crimes commillc<.l in rhe wnr in forme r Yugoslavia. Bussiuoni's Repo1 1 
confirmed that the 01hcr waniu~ factions comm.iucu :.;gnific:mlly fewer wur crimes 
uu<.l !.hat rhe Com.mi:;:.ioo could oot fin<.l indicarions that their cnmes were part 
of the guvemmcnt policies. 
l·or war crime:. see JOurnalist documenrarion: Gutmuo, Roy, A Witut"~~ tn 
Genocide. Macmillan Puhlishing Company, New York. 1993. 
34 M;~lcolm, Noel, op. cil. , p. 14. 
